Post details: Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections

2006-01-27

Permalink 11:32:57, by ratna Email , 1755 words, 242 views   English (EU)
Categories: Ratna's Review

Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections

The outcome of the Palestinian elections shows a classic paradox of democracy: the victory of an undemocratic and extremist party. The voting went fair and democratic, and more than in the elections of 1996, there was a vivid campaign and the Palestinian people really had something to choose. The Palestinians had probably one of the most democratic elections ever seen in the Middle East, and that is something to be proud of. Yet for many Israelis this is a grey day and in their eyes the result proves that most Palestinians don't want peace. The Israeli government has said from the start that it would not talk to Hamas and that there will be no negotiations with a government in which Hamas participates. Hamas has carried out hundreds of terrorist attacks in Israel since the 1990's, and wants to liberate all of Palestine through Jihad. The Hamas Charter labels all negotiations a waste of time, and says no Palestinian is ever allowed to give up one inch of historical Palestine. It harbors the worst anti-Semitic propaganda:

After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying.

Moreover, if the links have been distant from each other and if obstacles, placed by those who are the lackeys of Zionism in the way of the fighters obstructed the continuation of the struggle, the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to the realisation of Allah's promise, no matter how long that should take. The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, has said:
"The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree, (evidently a certain kind of tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews." (related by al-Bukhari and Moslem).

It is no wonder that an organization that says such things, is not viewed as a peace partner by the world's only Jewish state, and Abbas' remarks, that there is nothing for Israel to be afraid of, sound a bit surrealistic:

The Israelis must not be afraid of the Palestinian elections and the Palestinian democracy, which would be a rock foundation for peace between us (the Israelis and Palestinians). We will continue peace with the Israelis.

Some people, incorrigible optimists or with little understanding of what is necessary to come to peace, say that Hamas has become more pragmatic and for example offered a long term truce and did not rule out negoptiations. Besides, on a local level there is already cooperation between Hamas-led Palestinian towns and Israeli officials. People also refer to the fact that Hamas adhered to the informal truce during most of 2005. Also the fact that Hamas decided to run in the elections, and thus showed a willingness to take political responsibility, is cited as proof of Hamas' moderation. [Click here for some quotes of Hamas leaders and candidates during the election campaign.]

It is certainly true that there are both a more radical and a more pragmatic branch in Hamas. 'More pragmatic' compared to the radical branch, that is. It might seem a bit odd to some people, but offering a truce without disarmement, in return for all of the territories and East Jerusalem, and the right of return for all refugees, doesn't sound as a peace offer to most Israelis. Also, the fact that Hamas is willing to talk on a practical level to have the water or electricity supply guaranteed, doesn't sound really reconciliatory. It is true that Hamas carried out only one suicide attack in 2005, whereas Islamic Jihad, which opposed the truce, carried out several.
Hamas did fire hundreds of missiles at Israel from the Gaza Strip and has smuggled extensive amounts of weapons. In comparison: after the killing of Hamas leaders Yassin and Rantisi in the spring of 2004, the willingness to carry out attacks against Israel was enormous, yet it took them 5 months before they suceeded in doing so. The difference with Islamic Jihad is that the latter is much smaller and supported by Iran and probably more difficult for Israel to infiltrate. So, according to most Israelis, the truce was no sign from the side of Hamas of a willingness to compromise, but a tactical decision aimed at strengthening themselves for a future confrontation. The fact that Hamas entered the political process would have been a landmark if they had abandoned the armed option. In a democracy, it cannot be that political parties carry their own arms.
To conclude, although there are some signs of pragmatism they don't point in the direction of accepting Israel's right to exist and of a willingness to negotiate in stead of fight.

Regarding Israel's refusal to talk to Hamas, some people refer to the PLO in the 1980's. It also refused to recognize Israel and to renounce terror. It also called for Israel's destruction in it's charter, and it was also viewed by Israel and the USA as a terrorist organization. Yet it changed and entered negotiations that filled many people with hope. For its part Israel understood that a solution to the conflict is not possible without negotiating with the Palestinians, with their representatives to be more precise. It is certainly possible that Hamas would change in a similar way, but that is something different from assuming it is making such a change right now, and that therefore Israel should treat it as such.
Israel decided to talk to the PLO after it recognized Israel and renounced terror. A difference with the PLO is that Hamas is an islamic fundamentalist organization, and it is difficult to make compromises if Allah or God is behind you. That is also why it is unlikely that the Jewish religious fanatics will ever change. An Israeli government led by the National Religious Party and Moshe Feiglin is as unlikely to be ever able to make peace with the Palestinians as the Hamas is to compromise with Israel. The land is theirs, as promised by God and written down in their holy books.

The comparison with the PLO in the 1980's reveals another problem: despite the optimism and hope of that time, the peace process failed and an important reason for that was the fact that the PLO's recognition of Israel and renouncing of terror were not sincere. Arafat continued making bellicose statements in Arabic and supported terror, at least during the second intifada. To say it cynically, one can doubt if it is so much better for Israel to have to deal with a wolf in sheep's clothing than with a plain one.

Some cynical commenters say that there will not be much of a difference with a Hamas run government in the territories, as Israel didn't view Abbas as a peace partner either, and refused to negotiate with him until he disarmed the terrorists, something he was unwilling and probably also unable to do. Moreover, that might be one of the reasons for Hamas' popularity: Fatah, the main party in the PLO, has accomplished little during 10 years of talking with Israel. The only real concession was the disengagement, and that was not carried out as a result of a negotiated settlement, but unilaterally, because Israel was no longer willing to take the deaths it suffered in Gaza. Among Palestinians it is widely believed to be due to Hamas' 'armed struggle', not Abbas willingness to compromise. According to these people Israel owes the Hamas victory to itself.

It is certainly true that Israel could have done more to strengthen Abbas, but people who blame Israel for the failure of the peace process forget that it was Arafat who refused to accept Clinton's bridging proposals in 2000, and that the second intifada was planned months before Sharon's visit to the temple Mount, and was actively supported by the PA (see Myth 4 & 5). Abbas was more sincere in achieving peace with Israel than Arafat, but it is very hard for Israel to make a deal with someone who says that he is too weak to keep it.Yet the new centrist Kadima party (the most popular party since it's creation in november according to all polls) announced that it was willing to resume talks with Abbas after the elections, and it even spoke about some devision of Jerusalem. The victory of Hamas might change Israeli positions however, and strengthen the right. All those people who talk about the need for Israel to strengthen Abbas, tend to forget that Israeli moderates also need to be able to show to the public that their approach of making compromises is better for the country than the hawkish position of the right. The second intifada decimated the Israeli peace movement. What will a Hamas victory and possible third intifada do to the rest of it?

Despite Hamas' extremist views on Israel, one cannot say that the Palestinians voted for it because of its bellicose stance towards Israel. Probably the main reasons were frustrations with their daily lives, for which they held Fatah responsible, and the latter's widespread corruption, whereas Hamas provided social services, education and healthcare to the needy. Hamas also had a better organized election campaign, whereas in Fatah there was a lot of rivalry and different candidates campaigning against each other. However, the rhetoric about 'martyrs dying for the Palestinian homeland' and 'the need to kill the evil Zionists' and so on is very popular within the Palestinian street. For too many Palestinians, all Israelis have horns and a tail.

I have already heard left-wing commentators explain that Israel must accept the democratic outcome of the Palestinian elections and be willing to negotiate with whoever emerges as the new Palestinian leadership. A Dutch socialist politician even said: "Hamas is willing to talk to Israel, if not the Palestinians wouldn't have elected them." It is not the first time that Europeans think to know what Israel should do and what is good for peace. I sometimes wish that these persons would be Israeli PM for just one month to find out that 'from there, things look different than from here', but I don't think that would be very good for Israel.

Comments:

Comment from: Shimon Z. Klein [Visitor] · http://www.shimonzk.blogspot.com
An excellent well-researched article. It illustrates an excellent understanding of the Hamas psyche and their intransigence in recognizing Israel's right to exist. The links provided are appropriate. I strongly recommennd this article to all those interested in the dynamics of this dispute.Ratna, keep up the good work!
PermalinkPermalink 2006-01-28 @ 17:52
Comment from: Wendy Leibowitz [Visitor] · http://www.wendytech.com
I think it's easy to say, "Well, the terrorists won." And you could be right, Ratna. But I'll post a link to a transcript of three people who were there. I particularly respect the last speaker, Shibley Telhami, who called the election a peaceful overthrow of a regime. A non-violent revolution, if you will.
Just a little (perhaps naive) hope that things are not all grim. I don't think that the Palestinians voted for terrorism. THey voted against corruption.
Best wishes, Wendy in Washington
Please check out http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/fortherecord.php?ID=251
“The 2006 Palestinian Elections: What Next?”
Transcript of Remarks by Dalal Hasan, Edward Abington and Shibley Telhami
For the Record No. 242 (8 February 2006)*
PermalinkPermalink 2006-02-09 @ 17:35
Comment from: Wendy Leibowitz [Visitor] · http://www.wendytech.com
Just to clarify: I have no illusions about Hamas. But I don't think that all Palestinians who voted for Hamas were voting to reject Israel and support terrorism.

Here's one more article that is making waves, from Foreign Policy magazine:
http://foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3360

Getting Real With Hamas
By Nathan J. Brown
Posted February 2006

If President Bush and the European Union demand too much, too soon from Hamas, the effort could backfire and make things worse for the Palestinians, Israelis, and Western diplomacy.







End to aid? The United States and European Union have threatened to cut off funding to the Palestinian Authority.


Said Khatib/AFP/Getty Images


In Washington and Brussels, Hamas’s landslide victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections poses an immediate dilemma: what to do with all the funding for the Palestinian Authority? Although they are still coordinating their positions, the United States and European Union are leaning toward linking financial support to fundamental changes by the triumphant Islamist movement. In his January 31 State of the Union address, President Bush said “[T]he leaders of Hamas must recognize Israel, disarm, reject terrorism, and work for lasting peace.”

The conditions are reasonable enough, but they must be accompanied by careful thinking about how to measure compliance and progress. Setting conditions on Hamas may force it to confront difficult choices, but pressure applied clumsily will easily backfire. Just as bad, the United States and Europe could get handcuffed to a policy they will find it difficult to extricate themselves from later.

Cutting off funding entirely is a bad option that may provoke economic collapse and humanitarian disaster in the West Bank and Gaza. The demise of the Palestinian Authority would result in a leaderless society in a continuous state of low-level warfare with Israel. Islamists in the region who have argued in favor of democratic change will find themselves unable to answer the charge that the international community will never accept Islamist parties in power. It’s possible, alternatively, that Hamas would stave of fiscal collapse by turning to Iran and Saudi Arabia for funding—an alignment hardly likely to serve either U.S. or Israeli interests.

Accommodating a Hamas-led government and keeping international aid flowing may be more effective—but only if it supports the long-term goal of peace. Is that possible? Or is the group’s agenda simply too extreme? Hamas, after all, rejects a two-state solution and maintains a right to resistance—and the group’s definition of resistance includes murderous attacks on civilian targets.

Therefore, conditioning aid is a sound approach. Still, presenting demands for immediate change in stark and aggressive terms will likely elicit only resistance. Hamas is a movement that prides itself on its principles and is unlikely to abandon them easily. Even if some of its leaders wanted to shift positions, the movement’s ponderous decision-making structures would make it difficult to do so in the face of outside pressure. Any change in Hamas will likely be gradual.

As much as possible, the West should allow pressures from within the Arab and Muslim world to work. It’s important to recognize that the Palestinians themselves may demand a more moderate approach to Israel. Hamas is extremely sensitive to Palestinian public opinion and recognizes that the majority of voters actually favored parties supporting a two-state solution. (Hamas’s electoral campaign avoided mention of its hard-line position on Israel.) Other mainstream Islamist groups in the region—looking to Palestine as a test case—are unlikely to criticize (and may even cheer) a moderation of the Hamas position if it demonstrates that Islamists can govern effectively.

But if Hamas will not repudiate its position on Israel and terrorism immediately, what realistic benchmarks might be used to judge its moderation? What sort of steps might assure Israelis that a viable negotiating process is possible despite the Hamas landslide?

The demand that Hamas recognize Israel can be converted into several different formulas, some of which Hamas leaders have hinted (but only hinted) might be acceptable. For instance, Hamas might allow moderate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to negotiate with Israel as he pleases, with any resulting agreement subject to a referendum. Or it might allow the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO, Israel’s formal negotiating partner) to bargain with Israel, with any final agreement subject to approval by the body that oversees the PLO, the Palestine National Council. These mechanisms would allow Hamas to hold to its positions while still bowing to political realities.

None of these approaches offers guaranteed success, and the prospects for failure are substantial. But there will be plenty of time to deal with the consequences of failure. All players should now avoid locking themselves into positions they will regret later. If prospects for Arab democracy, democratic Islamic political movements, and Israeli-Palestinian peace are to survive the Hamas landslide victory, creative benchmarks rather than rigid slogans must be the guide.




Nathan J. Brown is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, professor of political science at George Washington University, and author of Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords. He served as an observer for the Palestinian elections as a member of the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center team.
PermalinkPermalink 2006-02-09 @ 20:29

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Ratna's Review on Israel, Zionism and Peace

Ratna's Review contains my thoughts on the Israel - Palestine conflict, the Jewish right to self determination (aka Zionism) and the Palestinian right to self determination, and especially the involvement of Europe with the conflict in the light of it's own history. I am Ratna Pelle, an academic from the Netherlands who has been active in several leftist movements for peace, environment and third world. I am neither Jewish nor Palestinian nor Israeli nor Arab.

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