This weekend many celebrated Israel’s Independence Day, but there is little to celebrate about Israel security. Let’s look at the current situation:

The main militarily problems Israel faced in Lebanon, I believe, were:
1) Unrelenting, well planned preparation by Hizbullah, with vigorous support by Iran and Syria, of intensive bunker networks, among other things.
2) No interference by Israel, 3) Using civilians to shield Hizbullah positions and fighters, 4) Ease of firing small rockets into Israeli communities, two people firing and escaping in a minute, 5) Very short distances between attackers and Israeli communities, 6) Forested mountains of Hizbullah positions.
These conditions precluded the effective use of airpower and remote forces, such as canons, to destroy the enemy. Only conquest of the enemy grounds could have been a solution. Because of the hilly, often forested terrain, it was also difficult for Israel to fight a ground war.
(Airpower alone was able to rapidly destroy long range rockets launchers because of their large size and signature fire trail).

The situation in Gaza strip is becoming more dangerous because it is similar in most respects to Lebanon, except a critical one: no forested mountains. Having lived near the Gaza strip I am familiar with the terrain: it is almost flat, no serious hills, no forested zones, and many dry riverbeds. That means, it is difficult to hide unless you build an extensive range of bunkers- which the Palestinians are busy preparing now. In addition, the population density is very high (about a million people) and the ability to hide among civilians is thus also high. Because of the radical nature of the Gaza population: over half below age 20, and one hundred thousands are armed and fighting one another, it is difficult to predict an easy military solution to Hizbullah-like relentless rocket attacks on Israeli population centers. The counter argument is that the Israeli population is considerably less dense than in the north, except that the city of Ashkelon and its region is an important Israeli center. But with larger rockets- they will have longer range.

A very large Israeli ground force would be required to recapture the Gaza zone. How long could it be present there? How much world pressure would be exerted on Israel to "be kind" to the Palestinian attackers and the local Arab population? Who will take over this force-intensive occupation?
Politically it is hard to say. Will the "world" better grasp the aggressiveness of the Palestinians, and put significant pressure on them? Will it be the same uselessness that the International force in Lebanon exhibits, allowing Hizbullah to rearm so rapidly?
We do not know because the global political attitude towards Gaza is different from Lebanon. The pressure to stop the fighting in Lebanon came relatively fast for a UN action because of the following conditions: France has a special protective attitude towards Lebanon because it occupied it for a quarter a century, and they promised a very large French force to secure Lebanon. (Which they did not send.) Europe wanted to help the newly emerging Democratic Lebanon to be freer from Syria domination, and half the population is Christian. And now France has a new, less”liberal” president.

Any way you look at it, it is a highly dangerous situation, since Israel will likely face a coordinated attack from Lebanon and Gaza at the same time. Fortunately, right now Israel controls much of the West Bank and can enter population centers as needed. But Israel does not know how much hidden preparation the West Bank is doing. If Israel did not have this access, the West Bank which is essentially in the center of Israel, could be another war front.

THE DANGER IS THAT SO MUCH IS HIGHLY UNPREDICTABLE IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL WAR. YOU DO NOT KNOW WHAT YOU DO NOT KNOW.
ISRAEL, LIKE THE USA, MUST STOP ASSUMING THE ARABS ARE THIRD CLASS THINKERS. IN UNCONVENTIONAL WAR. THEY ARE HIGHLY STREET SMART, MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED AND UNINHIBITED, THAN WE ARE

The incompetence and lack of support for the current Israeli government and especially the Minister of Defense, exacerbate Israel's ability to react to this developing danger. The positioning of General Efraim Sneh as Deputy Defense Minister is a good move, but still a stopgap measure.

It seems that I was mistaken supporting Sharon’s decision to leave Gaza. If a Gaza war starts, it could cost Israel much more in life and damage than the saving and political gain Israel won by leaving Gaza.

Read the following, please. He has good credentials.
Matania

STRATEGIC LESSONS OF THE WINOGRAD COMMISSION REPORT
Major General (res.) Yaakov Amidror
Institute for Contemporary Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org
Vol. 6, No. 29 7 May 200

In general terms, the Winograd Commission Report [just submitted to the Israeli government] dealt mostly with the flaws in the decision-making process in Israel. However, the report contains important insights into the strategic thinking that was predominant in the Israeli political-military leadership from the time of Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon until the outbreak of hostilities in July 2006, with the advent of the Second Lebanon War:

Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon on May 24, 2000. It was hoped that the withdrawal would erode the legitimacy of any continuing military activity by Hizbullah, especially in Lebanon's internal politics. At that time the Israeli government declared that any violation of Israeli sovereignty would bring about a harsh and immediate Israeli response.

These declarations stipulated that in the event of any assault on Israeli soldiers or civilians, all of Lebanon, Syria, and Hizbullah would be affected. The purpose of these statements was to build up Israeli deterrence in the aftermath of the withdrawal. Effective deterrence of this sort was critical for Israel, the Winograd Commission Report explains, for a number of reasons: after the Israeli pullout from Lebanon there was a lack of "elementary depth," there were many points of friction with Hizbullah, and finally there were multiple Israeli targets - both civilian and military - adjacent to the new Israeli-Lebanese boarder. At the same time, within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) the view developed that if need be, Israel could use "levers of influence" to restrain Hizbullah, such as attacks on Lebanese infrastructure and Syrian targets, as well.

Despite these strong declarations, Israel only responded locally to the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in October 2000. The Winograd Commission Report presents the assessment of Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh that the Israeli government at the time did not respond more forcefully because it did not want to show that its Lebanon withdrawal had actually produced an escalatory effect. Moreover, the Second Intifada had erupted and the Israeli government was concerned about having to wage a two-front war. This policy of restraint continued through March 2002, when Hizbullah attacked inside Israel near the town of Shlomi.

As a result, another view became deeply rooted in the Israeli national security establishment that Hizbullah's military buildup after Israel's Lebanon pullout was not so terrible as long as relative quiet along the border was preserved. Israel knew that Hizbullah was gaining strength and acquiring weaponry, but it preferred to turn a blind eye. As a result, Israel did not prepare for war with an enemy that was far more powerful than what it was familiar with in the past.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GAZA STRIP

In the Gaza Strip, a similar process is underway. Hamas is getting stronger as it organizes itself, digs fortifications underground, and builds up its military capabilities. Israel will have to ask itself whether it is preferable to delay the confrontation with Hamas, because meanwhile there is quiet or a temporary truce or some other illusory understanding. We are likely to find ourselves in exactly the same position in Gaza that we created with respect to Lebanon.

The Winograd Commission Report, which does not deal with the Gaza problem, describes Israeli policy toward Lebanon during 2000-2006 as a policy of "containment." Strictly speaking there is a problem with this terminology for what Israel pursued in Lebanon during this period, was not a pure policy of containment, which by definition implies preventing an adversary from reinforcing its capabilities.

What Israel is doing today in the Gaza Strip is not containment either, but rather a case of ignoring reality completely. It is an extremely costly policy. Few have any idea what price Israel will have to pay if it moves into Gaza in two or three years, when Hamas feels strengthened and has the capability to launch 122mm Katyusha rockets -which Hizbullah possessed in the thousands - as far as Ashdod and Kiryat Gat. Israeli decision-makers will have to take into account that inaction has a price, as well.

Anyone who has dealt with military affairs knows that it is impossible to thwart the firing of Katyusha or Qassam rockets by means of artillery fire, or by means of any land-based or air-based firepower. The Winograd Commission Report details, nonetheless, how many of Israel's operational plans for Lebanon during 2002-2004 did not require the use of maneuver units on the ground.

It is now clear that the only way to thwart rocket attacks is by controlling the situation on the ground. Qassam rockets are today landing in Sderot and Ashkelon - and not in Kfar Saba - because Israel does not control the situation on the ground in Gaza, whereas it has control of the ground around Qalqilya.

For political reasons, the IDF was not permitted by the political echelon to cross the Israeli-Lebanese border from 2000 to 2006. This allowed Hizbullah to conduct exercises day and night and to attack at will, while Israel was unable to stop any of its preparations. The only way to deal with such a situation in the long term is to allow the IDF to cross the border and halt such offensive preparations. As long as no responsible government is preventing attacks against Israeli territory, the IDF will have to adopt such an approach both with respect to its northern border with Lebanon and its southern border with the Gaza Strip.
***

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, program director of the Institute for Contemporary Affairs at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is former commander of the IDF's National Defense College and the IDF Staff and Command College. He is also former head of the IDF's Research and Assessment Division, with special responsibility for preparing the National Intelligence Assessment. In addition, he served as the military secretary of the defense minister.